| 000 | 01650c ua2200193 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 00000000000042096 | ||
| 008 | 110224 2010 gw 000 ger | ||
| 020 | _a978-3-89684-374-6 | ||
| 090 |
_a328 _bL 74 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aThe Limits of Power: Europe and America in a New World Order: _b145th Bergedorf Round Table |
| 260 |
_aHamburg: _bBergedorfer Gesprächskreis, _c2010. |
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| 300 |
_a116 p : _bpgotos; |
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| 440 | 0 | 0 | _aKörber-Stiftung edition |
| 500 | 1 | 0 | _aInv.: п/29999 |
| 520 | _aMany participants agreed with regard to the global significance of the transatlantic relationship.Global action was possible only if the US and Europe agreed to support it. Stronger transatlantic ties enhanced the willingness of others to apply to the rules of the West. However, the transatlantic partnership was considered to be rather weak currently. One participant thought it was a “sobering-up phase” after the “Golden Age” of the 1990s. Another criticized the fact that President Obama’s “trips for troops” suggested that the only thing he was interested in was European troops for Afghanistan. However, it was wrong to make the controversial issue of Afghanistan the most important topic of transatlantic relations. Others retorted that for Obama Europe was much more than a provider of troops and his motto was in fact “With power comes responsibility.” One participant suggested that the US and the EU should conclude a “Transatlantic Charter” which included a broader range of topics than those covered by NATO. | ||
| 653 |
_atransatlantic _aIran _ainterventions |
||
| 700 | 1 |
_aMüller-Härlin B _4edt |
|
| 005 | 20260805124322.0 | ||
| 999 |
_c9011 _d9011 |
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